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Common characteristics of Populism 
 
Populism: 
a) Is a political style more than an ideology (it could be right of left wing) 
b) Does an intensive, systematic use of transgressive and divisive rhetoric in a plain 
language fashion. Populists have little concern for political correctness; on the 
contrary part of its success consists in attracting media and people’s attention. No 
topic is off-limits. 
c) Has a political discourse aimed at hot-button issues connected with people’s fears 
and most pressing concerns.  
d) Offers a clear identification of “The Enemy” (no the adversary): The Elites, the 
Oligarchs, the USA, Brussels, the Immigrants, the Muslims, etc. 
e) Systematically refers to “the people”. 
f) Aims for radical, systemic change who cannot be brought about by the old parties, 
and in particular by the traditional Left: they are “political entrepreneurs”, 
“shakers” not “managers”. 
g) Takes advantage of lack of clear political alternatives to globalization, particularly 
on the part of the moderate Left. 
h) Rejects technocratic, expert-driven, consensual democracy. Politics is conflict, not 
consensus. 
i) Is a reaction against invisible, powerful economic forces that affect people’s 
everyday life. 
j) Thrives if traditional parties lose prestige due to economic downturns and 
political corruption. 
k) Finds fertile ground among those citizens with unmet expectations 
l) Is characterized by programmatic minimalism: offers simple solutions to complex 
issues. 
m) Has charismatic leaders embodied with good communications skills 
n) Aims to gain political power through democratic means, but it is illiberal 
o) It is highly opportunistic 
p) Seeks a return to the national framework (this is true as well for the radical Left) 
 
Right and left wing populisms 
 
Since populism is not an ideology, it is not restricted to either the Right or the Left. 
The main difference between Right and Left wing populism is that the first one 
emphasizes the ethno-cultural, even racial divide, whereas the second does it on the class 
divide (the enemy is the rich, the upper class, the oligarchs). A clear difference is 
obviously immigration, which is not opposed by left-wing populism.  However, at least in 
Europe, both kinds of populism are in general against the EU, the euro and globalization 
at large. So there is a convergence on Europeanization and globalization, and an 
unavoidable gap when it comes to immigration. 
 
Thus, right-wing populism is also more nationalistic, even though radical, left-wing 
populists in Europe have as well a negative view of economic integration at the European 
and global level given its capitalistic bias. In this regard, there is a confluence towards the 
Nation-State from populists from different ideological breeds, since both right-wing and 
left-wing populist reject critical economic globalization. Of course, in the case of right-
wing populism the Nation-State must be protected also from immigrants and foreign 
cultural influences.   
 
Also Latin American Populists (less son in Europe), do have a nationalist rhetoric, 
although it is not directed against immigrants or foreigners at large but to the US and the 
oligarchs, who are not truly part of the nation because they defend their privileges and are 
allied with foreign capitalists. 
 In this regard, we must take into account that it is not a matter anymore of left-wing 
populism in Latin America and right-wing populism in Europe. As the last European 
election has shown, now in the Old Place there are both kinds of populism, and they share 
a rejection of the EU, the Euro and economic and financial globalization. This left-wing 
populism is growing particularly in Southern Europe, and in Spain, parties like Podemos 
(We Can) has won more than a million votes and 5 seats in their first appearance before 
the voters. This party is lead by a charismatic journalist who openly takes inspiration 
from Latin American left wing populists. In Italy, a comedian like Beppe Grillo, shares 
with Spanish Podemos a rejection of the “Caste”, and a distaste for European integration. 
In this respect, Podemos and the 5 Star Movement are not so different from the French 
National Front. 
 
Rise of populism in Latin America 
 
Populism in Latin America is understood as the emergence of the forgotten population in 
the political sphere, traditionally kidnapped by the landed oligarchies, which occurred at 
the mid last century by personalistic political movements based on the masses (Löwy, 
1989). 
 
Currently, since the 90s, the emergence of these new movements in the region is called 
by some as the "Third Wave" of populism in Latin America (Susanne Gratius, 2007a), or 
"neo-populism" (De la Torre, 2013) or even “neoclassic populism” (Bonilla y Páez, 
2003). 
 
These new, left-wing populism movements in the Americas arise as a direct result of the 
economic crunch of the 19080s. This brought about a crisis in the institutional system. In 
addition, populism was fed by the failure of traditional parties, and also as a consequence 
of a history of right-wing, military dictatorships. Two other key factors are the presence 
of dispossessed indigenous peoples and natural resources in the hands of oligarchs and 
foreign companies.  
 Latin America, due to increasing public debt as a result of the petrodollar boom of the 
1970s, began implementing the economic policies of the Washington Consensus in the 
early 1980s, which had a negative impact in the region in terms of living standards and 
inequality. These were the years of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
introduced by the IMF and the World Bank as a condition for getting loans. Neoliberal 
policies such as fiscal adjustment, obsession with the deficit, contraction of public 
spending, reducing the role of the State in the economy, market deregulation and mass 
privatization paved the way for this populist comeback. The failure of these policies will 
be forever symbolized by the collapse of Mexico in 1994 and Argentina in 2001.  
 
It is interesting to note that this factor has not been present in Europe until the 2007-2008 
financial crisis. However, as it is now apparent, the fiscal adjustment policies applied 
since 2010 have now provoked the emergence of left-wing populisms in Greece (Siryza), 
Italy (5 Star Movement), Spain (Indignados movement, followed by Podemos), and the 
strengthening of existing right-wing populism (25 per cent of the vote in the last 
European election for the National Front in France). A new, Fascist-like political 
movement in Greece, Golden Dawn, collected more votes that the traditional Social-
Democratic Party, PASOK. 
 
In any event, the result in Latin America was the stark rejection of the traditional parties 
and the arrival of "outsiders", new politicians that had never participated before in 
the parties system (military personalities like Hugo Chavez, steelworkers like Lula, 
indigenous people like Evo Morales, clergymen like Fernando Lugo, former guerrilla 
fighter like José Mujica, etc.), mainly with eccentric personalities, but also endowed with 
great capacity for mass mobilization (Paramio, 2006) and communication skills. 
 
Main characteristics of Latin American Populism 
 
The basic characteristics that informed these left wing populist movements are the 
following: 
 - The political discourse is addressed to the impoverished masses.  
 
- Society is described in dual social categories: the people and the oligarchy.  
 
- Aiming for a new political system, including new participation schemes and 
constitutional reforms.  
 
- Focus on social policies as a way of redistributing excessively concentrated wealth, but 
also active intervention in the economy through public sector companies. 
 
- Recovery of natural resources and own sources of wealth currently in the hands of 
foreign companies. Latin American Populism find in this claim one of the most important 
parts of its political discourse. In this sense,  once in power, they recovered (by means of 
expropriation) key natural resources, creating companies where at least 51% of the 
control is public, guaranteeing thus the government control of the strategic decisions of 
these resources (i.e. YPF in Argentina). 
 
- Faith in the state as the main actor of economic policy. 
 
- Anti USA rhetoric. 
 
- Support for Latin American integration.  
 
- Indigenism. Indigenous movements did not participate before in the public life of Latin 
America. For former populisms this was not a cause. However, this new populism is 
highly marked by the defense of indigenous rights. The case of Evo Morales is a pretty 
clear example. In countries such as Paraguay, Bolivia or Ecuador with wide indigenous 
communities, populists have incorporated the indigenous discourse more than others such 
as Argentina, where the impact of this question is still rather limited. 
 
Some achievements  
 
- Exponential increase in public spending, particularly social spending. According to 
CEPAL all countries in the region increased its public spending, Ecuador for instance, 8 
points, while others such as Bolivia only 2.5 point GDP, during last years (since 2008) 1. 
 
- They have achieved a greater redistribution of wealth. According GINI index evolution, 
between 2002 and 2010 the Gini coefficient declined in 14 of the 18 countries and in 13 
this decrease was greater than 5 percentage points. Only Guatemala (latest year available 
2006) and Dominican Republic had a significant deterioration in income distribution in 
this period2, but these countries have not been ruled by populist leaders. 
 
- They have achieved an improvement in development as measured by the Human 
Development Index. Concretely in countries such as Brazil it has gone from 0.522 in 
1980 to 0.731 in 20133. 
 
- Regional integration is underway with different intensity and moderate success in the 
economic field (ALBA or MERCOSUR), security affairs (UNASUR), and media 
(Telesur). This new integration process has been named "post-liberal regionalism" 
(Sanahuja, 2007), because it is based on preserving autonomy from the US. 
 
Setbacks and challenges ahead 
 
- Long term sustainability of wealth redistribution. At the moment, many of these 
populist governments are conducting mere cash transfers to the lower classes based on 
availability of natural resources. 
 
- Overcoming inequality remains a challenge: growth continues to benefit the upper 
classes in a disproportionate fashion. 
                                                 
1 CEPAL. Perspectivas Económicas de América Latina. 2013. 
2 CEPAL. Panorama Social de América Latina. 2012. 
3 PNUD. Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano. 2013. 
 - Insecurity, particularly in some countries like Venezuela. 
 
- Endemic corruption. 
 
- Developing institutionalism beyond populist leader’s personalities. 
 
- Solid fiscal reforms to ensure effective redistribution of wealth. 
 
- Achieving stable growth even when the current demographic pyramid changes. 
 
- The economies are still based on the export of raw materials. Thus they are dependent 
on the high volatility of commodity prices. 
 
- These leaders need to move from this commodity export model to an industrialized one, 
investing further and better in human capital. Otherwise in the near future, a potential 
decrease of raw material prices could bring about a new crisis. 
 
- Persistence of the informal economy. 
 
- Overdependence on the Chinese market. 
 
- Increasing regional imbalances. The emergence of economic powers such as Brazil 
creates asymmetries.  
 
- Persistence of nationalism that delays effective regional integration. 
 
- The environmental variable is not yet sufficiently factored in the industrial policy. 
 
- Control increasing inflation 
 
  
Two kinds of populism? 
 
It seems that the region is divided between left-wing populists and left-wing moderates, 
even though some of the moderates come from a populist tradition such as Lula or 
Mujica. 
 
The first group is composed for example of countries such as Bolivia, Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and to some extent, Argentina. These leaders base its redistribution policies in 
cash or in-kind transfers to the lower classes, without putting in place sophisticated public 
policies aimed to keeping people out of poverty in the long run. 
 
The second group would be composed of countries such as Brazil or Uruguay, where 
they have developed their redistribution schemes through highly elaborated public 
policies with a long term outlook. Examples are Brazilian poverty policies, such as 
“Programa Bolsa Familia” or “Programa Hambre Cero”. 
 
Moreover, it could be claimed that populism in Latin America is a heterogeneous 
movement. Each manifestation in each country is the result of its singular history. In the 
case of Bolivia the indigenous issue marked the emergence of Evo Morales, as well as the 
“Guerra del Gas” in 2003 before the arrival to power of Morales in 2005. In Venezuela 
the “Pacto de Punto Fijo” (pact to share the power by turns among the two main parties, 
AD and COPEI) since 1958 until 1999, brought about an institutional crisis that helped 
an outsider like Hugo Chavez to gain power after a failed “coup d´etat”. In the cases of 
Argentina the crisis of “corralito” in 2001 pushed inside Peronism a left turn. Those are 
just examples that show that although there are some features in common, each populism 
is the product of the particular conditions in each country. 
 
End of a cycle in Latin American populism? 
 
Is Latin American populism finishing a cycle? It seems that this new populism (the third 
wave) widespread over the region since 2000s could be ending. The death of Hugo 
Chavez and the current political risis in Venezuela, the corruption scandals in the Partido 
de los Trabajadores of Lula in Brasil, the electoral defeat of Correa in Ecuador last 
February in the main cities, or the falling down of Cristina Fernandez in Argentina since 
2013 elections shows the decrease of Populism social support as a result of many years in 
power. The main reason of this “twilight” of populism is the exhaustion of its economic 
model, mainly through the increasing inflation of those countries, i.e, 56 per cent in 
Venezuela, 30 per cent in Argentina, etc. (Paranagua, 2014). 
 
Populism in Europe 
 
There is no European populism, but populism in European countries. 
 
The term could be applied to a big variety of parties and movements in Europe, not only 
from the right-wing side of of the political spectrum. However, all of them have 
something in common, the following statement: “we are the actual representatives of the 
population”.  
 
Thus they usually reject a legitimate opposition, and to some extent pluralism and, those 
from the right, diversity as well (Müller, 2014). 
 
Thus the opposition to pluralism is a key feature. Populists are really convinced that they 
are the only ones that truly represent the people (Buruma, 2014). 
 
Historically, while in Latin America populism has been left-wing, populism in Europe 
has adopted a right-wing outlook until the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the 
aftermath, which the last election cycle has made patently clear. Until the crisis, left-wing 
voters have mainly stayed around the more traditional Socialist and Communist parties, 
and these political forces have not adopted, at least until now, a fresher, populist outlook. 
 
Right-wing populism in Europe develops the following discourse: 
 
• Muslim religion as a threat  
• Anti-immigration stance - Fear of freedom of movement 
• Economic malaise is the fault of “Brussels” and mainstream parties 
• Eulogization of their national identity 
 
Origins and causes of right-wing National populism in European countries, or why 
half of manual workers in France vote for Le Pen: against immigration, 
Europeanization and Globalization 
 
The 1970s set the stage to the rise of right wing populism due to increasing external 
immigration coming from the former colonies (particularly in France at the time) and the 
economic crisis, which marked the end of the Keynesian era, and the start of Neoliberal 
globalization. Thus, this kind of populism has coincided with the triumph of 
Neoliberalism, the erosion of traditional Social Democracy and the demise of 
Communism in Eastern Europe.  
 
Social Democracy in the 1980s was in retreat almost everywhere in Western Europe, 
unable to explain the supply-side crisis of the 1970s while progressively embracing more 
positive views of the free market system, including privatization and trade and capital 
liberalization. As for the Communist Parties, in the West they were kept out power due to 
Cold War dynamics, and after 1989 they lost much of its appeal. In addition to this, it is 
important to note that these political forces have a radical message vis-à-vis Globalization 
but their style is not populist, at least until now, nor have been led by people endowed 
with particularly good communications skills or personal appeal (young, energetic, 
outsider, etc.). Lastly, Communist parties in the West, with some exceptions, have not 
been opposed to European integration “per se”; they have called for a different kind of 
Europe. Au contraire, both far-right and radical left populists do share a clear rejection of 
regional integration in Europe, even though some in the traditional communist left share 
this view while some left-wing populists have a more nuanced view of the EU, which is 
closer to the idea of a “another Europe is possible”. We have to take into account that 
traditional communist parties and the new left-wing populists have common ideological 
traits and some of the latter’s leaders have been members of the former. 
 
Thus as a result, the far right started to gain ground among working class voters, also 
because the traditional left had little to say about the immigration issue, which does have 
an economic impact on low-skilled workers in terms of downward pressure on wages and 
a higher ratio of jobseekers per vacancy. Hence, as early as 1984 the National Front in 
France, founded in 1972, was winning 11 per cent of the vote. On the 25th May 1 out 4 
voters did. 
  
In addition to the immigration issue, from the mid-1980s onwards Europeanization was 
starting to be seen as the Trojan horse of Globalization, a phenomenon that destroys jobs 
at home due to open borders and foreign competition, while European institutions were 
seemingly pursuing a Neoliberal agenda in the EU. In this regard, the Single European 
Act paved the way not only for the single market in Europe, but also for the unilateral 
liberalization of capital flows with the rest of the world. 
 
At the time of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, only 2 out of 12 governments in the EU had 
a Socialist prime minister. A monetary union was born with no fiscal or social 
underpinnings, excepting strict limits to government deficits and public debt, a sort of 
restrictive fiscal federalism. Social Democrats by and large supported it since it meant 
nonetheless a move towards further European integration, seen as a good thing in itself. 
Thus, the Stability and Growth Pact agreed in Maastricht imposed spending limits to the 
Member States without Europeanizing the Welfare State, while the rhetoric and 
recommendations coming from the EU Commission is invariable centered on improving 
competitiveness and not on promoting social policies at the national level.  
 
As for the traditional Communist parties, weakened by the fall of the Berlin in 1989, they 
opposed the arrangements of Maastricht but have not called in general for leaving either 
the UE or the Eurozone, even though the Party of the European Left proposed in this 
election returning some competencies to the National Level.  
 
Still, leaving the EU, the Eurozone and the recovery of national sovereignty is common 
among radical, extra-parliamentary left-wing parties beyond the traditional Communist 
parties, because they are considered tools of global capitalism that cannot be reformed, 
and this discourse has been adopted to some extent by emerging left wing populists in 
Europe. In this respect, there is a degree of convergence between the radical right and the 
radical left when it comes to Europeanization and Globalization. There is though 
complete divergence on the immigration cleavage as well as on the need to preserve 
traditional values and national identity.  
 
Immigration is precisely one of the main issues of the populist right. According to this 
story-line, immigration puts downward pressure on local wages and increases the number 
of competitors for the same job vacancy. The French National Front made the “national 
preference for jobs” its trademark. Hence European right-wing populism is certainly 
nationalist, opposed to both foreign workers and foreign products. In this sense, is also 
anti-European as far as there is no distinction between migrants from within or outside 
the EU. This is very clear in the case of the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP). 
 
To sum up, the right-wing populism that came of age in the 1970s and 1980s has become 
more explicitly anti-European over time, nurtured by increasing integration and the 
corresponding loss of national sovereignty and the perceived lack of democratic 
legitimacy. This is clearly the case of the National Front in France, a party that started 
mainly as a reaction against immigration. Later on, it took on Europeanization and 
Globalization. 
 
Euroskepticism as populism 
 
Almost all populists in Europe are Euroskeptical or Europhobes (on the right), or at least 
highly critical of the present-day EU institutions and policies (on the left). Thus, we must 
acknowledge that Euroskepticism is found on both sides of the ideological spectrum. 
While right-wing Euroskeptics reject European integration largely in order to preserve 
national identity and keep immigrants out, the left-wing ones tend to propose a return to 
the Nation-State as a better alternative than a Neoliberal Europe.  
  
However, not all Euroskeptics are populists. There are a number citizens,  politicians, 
academics and intellectuals that believe the European project is either not desirable in 
itself or that has become too ambitious and overwhelming and doubt that national 
rivalries can be overcome. These Euroskeptics do not have a populist style, but an 
intellectually conservative outlook. Still, this approach does not have a strong political 
incarnation exception perhaps a growing faction of the British Conservative Party (where 
some have nonetheless adopted a populist discourse). 
 
Euroskepticism in its populist version displays a discourse against European technocrats, 
often vulgar, ad personam attacks, while pointing out the lack of popular sovereignty and 
democratic legitimacy in the EU.   
 
In comparison with the French National Front, The United Kingdom Independence Party, 
UKIP, is a much more recent phenomenon. It is almost a single-issue right wing 
populism since it centers around the membership of the UK in the EU. It is of course anti-
immigration, but as part of a general disgust from everything connected with EU policies 
and an affirmation of British national identity. 
 
Still, the negative outcome of the referendums in 2005 on the European Constitution 
(Holland and France) showed Euroskepticism was not confined to the UK nor to the 
right: the referendum was lost in the French Republic partly as a result of the split within 
the Socialist Party on the issue, due to the lack of a proper social dimension in the 
Constitutional Treaty. In the Czech Republic as well, former President Klaus derided the 
EU and compared it with the Soviet Union. 
 
In any event, the financial and economic crisis has strengthened this rhetoric against the 
EU institutions by both right and left wing populisms. In this sense they follow on the 
footsteps of previous stages in European history (the rise of political extremism in the 
1930s when there was as well lack of economic prosperity and a weakening of the 
interwar party systems). 
 
In addition to attacking the EU institutions, populist parties have developed a discourse 
against other Member States, which is a novelty. Thus, left-wing populists in Southern 
Europe have directed their rhetoric against the Germans, responsible of being egotistic 
and imposing austerity, while in Germany and Finland have surged newly created parties 
(Alternative for Germany, True Finns) that claim their virtuous countries are being 
exploited by the irresponsible Greco-Latin partners.  
 
Nonetheless, it will be very difficult for the different right-wing populist parties to join 
forces at the European Parliament (the non-Social Democratic Left is already organized 
as a parliamentary group). It is important to bear in mind that MEPs do not have real 
influence in the European Parliament unless they belong to a parliamentary group, and 
this requires members from different countries in sufficient numbers. 
 
The right wing populists have wide differences among all of them (Buruma, 2014) and 
are very nationalistic, unlike their counterparts on the Left.  It is highly unlikely to see 
rancorous British nationalist Nigel Farage joining forces with the French National Front 
just for the sake of their common distaste for the European project.  
 
Plus, the surge of these parties in the last election cycle has been uneven. The UKIP and 
the National Front had good showings, but not Lega Nord in Italy or Wilders party in the 
Netherlands. The overwhelming majority of seats at the European Parliament is cin the 
hands of clearly pro-European parties such as the European Popular Party, the Party of 
European Socialists, the Liberals, and the Greens. 
 
Why not right wing populism in Latin America? 
 Several factors have prevented the emergence of right-wing populism in Latin America: 
 
a) External migration is not a factor nowadays like in Europe, where it is exploited 
in order to find scapegoats for social ills and the economic crisis. Internal 
migration is general less differentiated in terms of language, culture and religion. 
b) Latin American countries have been by and large subjected to right-wing 
dictatorships until relatively recently, hence leaving no appetite for far right 
parties in the democratic era.  
 
c) The impact of SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s has given support to left-wing 
populism; the economic collapse helped the political “outsiders”. The impact of 
radical fiscal adjustment policies has become a factor in Europe only after 2010 
and it could become more so in the future if the economic stagnation continues. 
 
d) In Latin America regional integration is far less developed, and hence there is 
considerably les room to blame other countries or supranational bodies for 
economic troubles (with the exception of the USA).  
 
e) Anti-foreign rhetoric is limited to the USA as a result of a long left wing critical 
tradition of US imperialism. Although there is a relatively large homogeneity in 
the region (language, culture…) it seems to be the only topic that is common and 
able to overcome the nationalism.  
 
f) A lower degree of cultural and linguistic heterogeneity compared to Europe, and a 
tradition of Ibero-American rhetoric that is shared by both the Left and the Right, 
going back to the emancipation from the Spanish and Portuguese empires. No 
comparable tradition of a common heritage can be found in Europe and thus 
traditional nationalism still plays a considerable role in European politics, which 
is exploited by right-wing populist parties though stereotypes and prejudices. 
 
g) An older tradition of inter-racial relations including coupling, which makes 
racism and xenophobia less likely to become politically acceptable visi-a-vis 
Europe. 
 
h) In Latin America nationalist rhetoric is captured by the populist Left: nation = 
people = disempowered. The oligarchs are depicted as traitors to the nation/people 
because they are allied with foreign multinationals and multilateral organizations 
(IMF, WB). In Europe, the concept of nation is manly captured by the anti-EU, 
far right, populist parties. 
 
i) The abundance of natural resources controlled by oligarchs and foreign 
companies and dispossessed indigenous peoples drives the populist point home 
about the divide between the rich and the rest. 
 
j) Lack of a decadent lower middle class and working class in Latin America in 
which the populist far right normally thrives (i.e. industrial workers losing jobs 
due to foreign competition, etc.) Where society is divided between a small upper 
class and a wide bottom composed of civil servants, workers and the poor, the 
traditional right does not leave much room for the populist far right, which has its 
base among those that have lost their status in society. Hidden racism particularly 
against indigenous peoples subsists in right wing parties and even across societies 
but it cannot be openly stated. In other words, manual workers in Latin America 
are by and large winners from globalization due to an increasing share of global 
production and trade, while low skilled workers in Europe are losers due to 
industrial delocalization, and downward pressure on wages as a result of 
immigration.   
 
Conclusions 
 
Perhaps the key difference between populism in Latin America and Europe, apart from 
the fact that the right-wing kind has been the norm until recently in our continent, is the 
fact that the left-wing populism has actually ruled countries such as Argentina, Brazil, 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador or Uruguay. Populists in European governments have been 
more exceptional, although Haider’s far right in Austria was part at some point of a 
coalition government and today Orban’s populism rules Hungary.  
 
As a result, while populism in Latin America maybe be at the end of cycle, as result of 
many years in government, populist parties in Europe from both right and left are 
growing in popular support, a process that has gone hand in hand with the recent 
economic crisis but also with immigration, Europeanization and globalization. To some 
extent, we witness, particularly in Southern Europe, a sort of “Latinamericanization” of 
politics. 
 
In particular, EU institutions and policies have become a preferred target for all kinds of 
populists, and the moderates parties that have traditionally supported regional integration 
suffer from it. The EU post-national ideal and freedom of movement is despised by right 
wing populists. The lack of social dimension and support for free trade and capital 
movements with the rest of the world alienates both strains of populism, as well as its 
perceived lack of democratic legitimacy.  
 
Paradoxically, despite social-democratic and Eurocommunist aspirations (political 
Europe as a counter-weight to the market), the politicization of integration (through a 
dense, rigid institutional apparatus) consolidated and solidified the liberalisation of 
Europe. In a sense, as Cramme aptly notices, “half-way federalization has brought the 
worst of both worlds to the fore”. 
 
Thus, the traditional post-War parties in support of European integration are not seen as 
problem solvers, particularly in the complex institutional structure of the EU. The EU, as 
argues Simon Hix, “is perhaps more consensus-oriented in its design than any other 
political system in the history of modern government”. 
 
For a policy to be adopted it requires (depending on the sector and institution) strong 
majorities or unanimity, which lead the member States or the national parties either to 
build grand coalitions or to abandon their policies. 
 
Negotiation, the endless processes of compromise and wheeling and dealing, and the 
increased weight of technocratic solutions largely neutralise ideological fractures and the 
left-right cleavage. Europe reduces the political repertoire of party formations especially 
major parties with a governmental vocation. It tends to inhibit programmatic innovation 
whilst programmatic convergence and the weakening of cleavages find an extremely 
fertile terrain. 
 
The “Europe” factor hinders genuine policy and governmental alternatives not only at the 
European level but also at national level. Consequently, the new European environment is 
conducive to the weakening of the ideological differences of contemporary moderate 
parties. They are not in a position to produce a grand vision, a new major narrative, an 
alternative perspective to the present and the future, even though such an alternative 
would probably be in their electoral interest.  
 
By contrast and paradoxically, radical populist parties, Left or Right, have greater tactical 
flexibility today, and to some extent, greater strategic flexibility than the mainstream 
parties. 
 
As said before, there are many similarities between the populisms of the Left and of the 
Right. The harsh criticism of globalization and finance capitalism, of the EU, of the 
downgrading of national parliaments and democracy, are just some of them. Attribution 
of central significance to the cleavage establishment/ people is another point of 
convergence between the Far Right and the Far Left. But the differences are just as great, 
if not greater. 
 
Today’s Radical Left has for the most part embraced the themes and mottos of the 1960s 
New Left (feminism, ecology, minorities’ rights, multiculturalism, immigration etc.), 
issues and preoccupations that share little common terrain with right-wing populism. In 
terms of economic policy its discourse bears increasing resemblance to that of the old 
Keynesian Social Democracy. 
 
Solutions 
 
The crisis of the representation of the social model existed well before the rise of 
populism; globalization and the end of Keynesianism during the 1970s accelerated this 
trend. The new populist forces only had to creep into the breach which was already there. 
 
In particular, the rise of populism in Europe has coincided with the loss of vitality of the 
traditional left. Social democrats in particular, since the 1980s onwards, abandoned their 
classic ideology in favor of the free market and globalization. As Cuperus claims, social 
democracy has come to represent the educated, highly mobile middle class more than 
manual workers. As a result, they represent the winners of integration, whether it is 
Europeanization or globalization, while open borders for both workers and products are 
no good for the non-elites. 
 
Thus, social democracy can regain ground among its traditional electorate emphasizing a 
viable alternative to Neoliberal Globalization, in particular ending support for free trade 
unless social and environmental standards are met by emerging economies, and 
repudiating privatizations. Some degree of protectionism in Europe is needed to re-
industrialize the continent and reduce unemployment, and social democrats can support 
it.  
 
A full federal political union in Europe, with a fully politicized Commission and a 
reduced role for the European Council is needed to counterbalance market liberalization 
and develop the social dimension of the project. In particular, the EU will become 
popular among citizens if they see benefits such as the obligation to set up a minimum 
wage in each country, unemployment benefits, non-contributive pensions, etc. In this 
sense, the EC Commission should at least complement the competitiveness and austerity 
rhetoric with one promoting higher social standards within the EU. This is a natural 
agenda Social Democrats. This also means that the European Socialist Party must 
consider whether to support further the deepening of the single market on the condition of 
this being matched by progress on the political and social union.  
 
Also, European social democrats can learn from populists in order to communicate their 
message better and create a dynamic of political conflict instead of a consensus one with 
the European Popular Party. As said before, the blurring of ideological differences at the 
European level and the lack of programmatic innovation in mainstream parties helps 
populists. Moreover European socialists depend excessively of professional politicians, 
which are typically risk-adverse personalities who follow the party line strictly, a rather 
unappealing kind of public persona.  
 
Lastly, populism in Europe also exploits the average citizen lack of knowledge of how 
the EU works, simplifying the reality or making outright false claims. Hence EU 
institutions become a caricature. Those parties committed with European integration 
should agree to mainstream European civics education in all Member States. 
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